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Abstract—This paper presents a novel deep learning based
method for automatic malware signature generation and classi-
fication. The method uses a deep belief network (DBN), imple-
mented with a deep stack of denoising autoencoders, generating
an invariant compact representation of the malware behavior.
While conventional signature and token based methods for
malware detection do not detect a majority of new variants for
existing malware, the results presented in this paper show that sig-
natures generated by the DBN allow for an accurate classification
of new malware variants. Using a dataset containing hundreds of
variants for several major malware families, our method achieves
98.6% classification accuracy using the signatures generated by
the DBN. The presented method is completely agnostic to the
type of malware behavior that is logged (e.g., API calls and
their parameters, registry entries, websites and ports accessed,
etc.), and can use any raw input from a sandbox to successfully
train the deep neural network which is used to generate malware
signatures.
Keywords—Deep Learning, Deep Belief Network, Autoencoders,
Malware, Automatic Signature Generation
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the nearly exponential growth in the number of new
malware (e.g., Panda Security reports that on average 160,000
new malware programs appeared every day in 2013 [18]),
the method for defending against these threats has largely
remained unchanged. Anti-virus solutions detect the malware,
analyze it, and generate a special handcrafted signature which
is released as an update to their clients. This manual analysis
phase typically takes a long time, during which the malware
remains undetected and keeps infecting new computers. Addi-
tionally, even when detected, the authors of malware programs
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usually make some minimal changes to their code, so that the
new variant is undetected by the anti-virus software. This “cat
and mouse” game between malware developers and anti-virus
companies goes on for many years for most major malware
programs, and with each release of a new variant, thousands
of computers are infected.
Several methods have been proposed for automatic mal-
ware signature generation, e.g., signatures based on specific
vulnerabilities, payloads, honeypots, etc. A major problem
associated with these methods is that they target specific
aspects of the malware, thus allowing the malware developers
to create a new undetected variant by modifying small parts
of their software. For example, a malware spreading through
the use of a specific vulnerability found in Windows operating
system, can use another vulnerability in the system to spread,
thus evading vulnerability-based signatures.
In this paper we present a novel method for signature
generation which does not rely on any specific aspect of
the malware, thus being invariant to many modifications in
the malware code (i.e., the proposed approach is capable of
detecting most new variants of any malware). The method
relies on training a deep belief network (DBN) [8], i.e., a
deep unsupervised neural network, which would create an
invariant compact representation of the general behavior of
the malware. In recent years DBNs have proven successful in
generating invariant representations for challenging domains,
and our method attempts to use similar principles for generat-
ing invariant representations for malware.
The proposed method consists of the following steps in
the unsupervised training phase: Given a dataset of malware
programs, run each program in a sandbox to generate a text
file containing the behavior of the program. Then, parse the
sandbox text file and convert it to a binary bit-string to
feed it to the neural network. Next, a deep belief network
implemented using deep denoising autoencoders is trained by
layer-wise training. The training is completely unsupervised,
Ref: International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), pages 1–8, Killarney, Ireland, July 2015.
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and the network is not aware of the labels of each sample.
The DBN has eight layers, and its output layer contains 30
neurons. Thus, the resulting deep network basically generates
a signature containing 30 floating point numbers for each
program run in a sandbox.
We use a large dataset, containing several major malware
categories and several hundred variants for each. The trained
DBN generates a signature for each malware sample. The
quality and representation power of these generated signatures
is examined by running several supervised classification meth-
ods on them. The results show that a deep neural network
achieves 98.6% classification accuracy when tested on unseen
data, which attests to the representation power of the signatures
due to DBN.
In the next section we review several previous approaches
for automatic signature generation. In Section III we describe
our approach, and Section IV presents implementation details
and experimental results. Section V contains our concluding
remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
It is very difficult to successfully generate signatures which
can be used to prevent new attacks, and so the conventional
methods are usually ineffective against zero-day malware [6],
[26], [28]. Several approaches have been suggested to improve
the signature generation process. Here we briefly review sev-
eral of them.
Several methods which try to cope with new malware
variants do so by analyzing the traffic (assuming that traffic
patterns do not change substantially for each variant of the
malware). Autograph [11] records source and destination of
connections attempted from outside the network (inbound
connections). An external source is considered to be a scanner
if it has made more than a prespecified number of attempts to
connect to an IP address in the network. After deeming this
external source a scanner, and thus potentially malicious, Au-
tograph selects the most frequent byte sequence from the net-
work traffic of this source and uses it as its signature. A scanner
malware already signed by Autograph can evade detection by
modifying its most frequent byte sequence. A similar approach
for signature generation based on network traffic is Honeycomb
[12], which analyzes the traffic on the honeypot. Honeycomb
uses largest common substrings (LCS) to generate signatures
and measure similarities in packet payloads. The PAYL sensor
[28] monitors the flow of information in the network and tries
to detect malicious attacks using anomaly detection, assuming
that the packets associated with zero-day attacks are distinct
from normal network traffic. The Nemean architecture [30] is
a semantic-aware Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
which normalizes packets from individual sessions in the
network and renders semantic context. A signature generation
component clusters similar sessions and generates signatures
for each cluster. Another semantic-aware method is Amd [5],
which generates semantic-aware code templates and specifies
the conditions for a match between the templates and the
programs being checked. Polygraph [20] generates content
based signatures that use several substring signatures (tokens),
to expand the detection of malware variants. EarlyBird [24]
sifts through the invariant portion of a worm’s content that will
appear frequently on the network as it spreads or attempts to
spread. Netspy [28] also uses the invariant portion of network
traffic generated by malware to generate a signature.
The majority of anti-virus programs reply on analyzing the
executable file to determine whether it is a malware. As Filiol
and Josse [6] establish, most current anti-virus programs do
not detects variant of malware. They propose a method for
automatic signature generation by analyzing the executable’s
code and substrings, and measure statistical distribution of
code across variants of malware. Their experiments were
performed on short (small sized) malware such as Nimda,
Code Red/Code Red II, MS Blaster, Sober, Netsky and Beagle.
This method is less accurate when applied to larger malware.
Most real world malware are large, containing many modules
and sub-modules, and so a statistical analysis would not be
sufficient to accurately classify them. Auto-Sign [25] generates
a list of signatures for a malware by splitting its executable
to segments of equal sizes. For each segment a signature is
generated, and the list of signatures is subsequently ranked.
This method is more resilient to small modifications in the
executable, but a malware can evade this method by encrypting
the executable (which is a simple and popular method for
many malware programs), and thus evading any method which
inspects the executable file for signature comparison.
Since current approaches mostly rely on specific behavior
of malware for signature generation (e.g., specific network
traffic, or specific substrings in executable, etc.), new malware
variants could be created with minimal modifications, such that
they would not be detected by the conventional methods. In
the next section we propose a method for signature generation
based on the behavior of the program, without focusing on
any specific aspect of the executable or network traffic, thus
making it difficult for a malware variant to evade detection.
III. PROPOSED SIGNATURE GENERATION METHOD
This section provides our novel approach for signature
generation. The main question we are trying to answer is the
following: Is it possible to generate a signature for a program
that represents its behavior, and is invariant to small scale
changes? In recent years deep learning methods have proven
very successful in accomplishing this very task in computer
vision. Deep neural networks are trained to create invariant
representations of objects, so that even when the object is
in a different position, size, contrast, angle, etc., the network
still detects the object correctly. These networks have achieved
under 10% error in the difficult task of ImageNet [14], [23].
Unsupervised versions of these networks have been developed
as well, e.g. [16], [17], where deep belief networks were
training by merely exposing the networks to images randomly
taken from YouTube videos. Krizhevsky and Hinton [13] used
deep autoencoders to create short binary codes for images
based on their content (e.g., pictures containing elephants will
have similar codes, etc.).
Our method uses these principles and applies them for
modeling the behavior of programs (and specifically, malware).
The goal is that the obtained representation would be invariant
to small scale changes, and thus capable of detecting most
variants of malware1. To accomplish this goal, we first need
to find a way to represent the behavior of a program as a fixed
sized vector, which would be the input to the neural network.
We will then train a deep belief network which would produce
invariant representations of the input. The output of the DBN
will be the signature for the malware.
A. Program Behavior as Binary Vector
Behavior of programs (and specifically malware) is typ-
ically recorded by running the programs in a sandbox. A
sandbox is a special environment which allows for logging
the behavior of programs (e.g., the API function calls, their
parameters, files created or deleted, websites and ports ac-
cessed, etc.) The results are saved in a file (typically a text
file). Figure 1 shows a snippet of logs recorded by a sandbox.
Sandbox records are usually analyzed manually, trying to learn
information that would assist in creating a signature for the
malware (see Section II).
The simplest method for converting the sandbox generated
text file to a fixed size string is using one of the methods
common in natural language processing (NLP). Of these
methods, the simplest yet is unigram (1-gram) extraction. For
example, given a dataset of text samples, find the 5,000 most
frequent words in the text (these words would comprise the
dictionary), and then for each text sample check which of
these 5,000 words are present. Thus, each text sample is
represented as a 5,000 sized bit-string. Unlike language text
files, sandbox files contain a variety of information, and require
several preprocessing stages to extract the useful content (e.g.,
1Note that there are many similarities between our approach and that of
Krizhevsky and Hinton [13], as both use deep autoencoders to create short
signatures for the content; in our case the content is the high level behavior
of the program (and not specific low level features such as strings in the
executable), and in Krizhevsky and Hinton’s case, it is the high level objects
appearing in the image (and not low level features based on pixels in the
image).
Fig. 1. A snippet from the log file generated by Cuckoo sandbox.
string after "api" tag contains the name of function call,
etc.). However, in order to remain as domain agnostic as
possible, we propose to treat the sandbox file as a simple
text file, and extract unigrams without any preprocessing. That
is, all the markup and tagged part of the files are extracted
as well (e.g., given "api": "CreateFileW", the terms
extracted are "api": and "CreateFileW", completely
ignoring what each part means). While this may sounds absurd
(intentionally adding useless noise where it can be easily
removed), this should not pose a problem, since the learning
system (described below) should easily learn to ignore these
irrelevant parts. Specifically, our method follows the following
simple steps to convert sandbox files to fixed size inputs to
the neural network: (1) For each sandbox file in the dataset,
extract all unigrams, (2) remove the unigrams which appear in
all files (contain no information), (3) for each unigram count
the number of files in which it appears, (4) select top 20,000
with highest frequency, and (5) convert each sandbox file to a
20,000 sized bit string, by checking whether each of the 20,000
unigrams appeared in it. In other words, we first define which
words (unigrams) participate in our dictionary (analogous to
the dictionaries used in NLP, which usually consist of the most
frequent words in a language), and then for each sample we
check it against the dictionary for the presence of each word
and thus produce a binary vector.
B. Training a Deep Belief Network
The previous subsection described a simple method for
converting the behavior of a computer program to a fixed
size binary vector. As we discussed previously, most malware
variants make small changes in their code (i.e., small changes
in behavior), which is sufficient to evade the classical signature
generation methods. We would like to generate a signature for
each program which is resilient to these small changes (an
invariant representation, similar to those used for computer
vision). In order to achieve this goal, we create a deep
belief network (DBN) by training a deep stack of denoising
autoencoders.
An autoencoder is an unsupervised neural network which
sets the target values (of the output layer) to be equal to the
inputs, i.e., the number of neurons at the input and output
layers is equal, and the optimization goal for output neuron i
is set to equal xi, which is the value of the input neuron i. A
hidden layer of neurons is used between the input and output
layers, and the number of neurons in the hidden layer is usually
set to fewer than those in the input and output layers, thus
creating a bottleneck, with the intention of forcing the network
to learn a higher level representation of the input. That is, for
each input x, it is first mapped to a hidden layer y, and the
output layer tried to reconstruct x. The weights of the encoder
layer (W) and the weights of the decoder layer (W′) can
be tied (i.e., defining W′ =WT ). Autoencoders are typically
trained using backpropagation with stochastic gradient descent
[22], [29].
Recently it has been demonstrated that denoising autoen-
coders [27] generalize much better than basic autoencoders
in many tasks. In denoising autoencoders each time a sample
is given to the network, a small portion (usually a ratio of
about 0.1 to 0.2) of it is corrupted by adding noise (or more
often by zeroing the values). That is, given an input x, first
it is corrupted to x˜ and then given to the input layer of the
network. The objective function of the network in the output
layer remains generating x, i.e., the uncorrupted version of the
input (see Figure 2). This approach usually works better than
basic autoencoders due to diminishing the overfitting in the
network. By having to recreate the uncorrupted version of the
input, the network is forced to generalize better, and determine
more high level patterns. Additionally, since the network rarely
receives the same input pattern more than once (each time
sees a corrupted version only), there is a diminished risk of
overfitting (though it still takes place). Finally, using denoising
autoencoders the hidden layer need not necessarily be smaller
than the input layer (in basic autoencoder such a larger hidden
layer may result in simply learning the identity function). Note
that the noise is added only during training. In prediction time
the network is given the uncorrupted input (i.e., similar to basic
autoencoder).
When an autoencoder’s training is complete, we can dis-
card the decoder layer, fix the values of the encoder layer (so
the layer can no longer be modified), and treat the output of
Fig. 2. One layer of denoising autoencoder during training.
the hidden layer as the input to a new autoencoder added on
top of the previous autoencoder. This new autoencoder can be
trained similarly. Using such layer-wise unsupervised training,
deep stacks of autoencoders can be assembled to create deep
neural networks consisting of several hidden layers (forming a
deep belief network). Given an input, it will be passed through
this deep network, resulting in high level outputs. In a typical
implementation, the outputs may then be used for supervised
classification if required, serving as a compact higher level
representation of the data.
In our approach we train a deep denoising autoencoder con-
sisting of eight layer: 20,000–5,000–2,500–1,000–500–250–
100–30. At each step only one layer is trained, then the weights
are “frozen”, and the subsequent layer is trained, etc. (see
Figure 3). At the end of this training phase, we have a deep
network which is capable of converting the 20,000 input vector
into 30 floating point values. We regard these 30-sized vector
as the “signature” of the program. Note that the network is
trained only using the samples in the training set, and for
all future samples it will be run in prediction mode, i.e.,
receiving the 20,000-sized vector it will produce 30 output
values, without modifying the weights.
The next section provides implementation details and ex-
perimental results, and demonstrates that the resulting 30-sized
vector (i.e., the signature) indeed provides a good invariant
representation of the malware.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we first describe the malware dataset and
the properties of the sandbox that was used, then provide the
details of the trained neural network, and finally present our
experimental results.
A. Malware Dataset and Sandbox
Our dataset consists of six major categories of malware,
and 300 variants in each category, for a total of 1,800 sam-
ples. Each of these six malware categories spread massively
worldwide and caused a tremendous damage. Hundreds of
variants of them were created, each time modifying some
Fig. 3. Illustration of DBN training. (I) Train the first autoencoder layer. (II) Use the weights from the previous layer, and build a new autoencoder on top of
them. The weights taken from the first autoencoder are frozen. (III) Similarly, take the weights from the previous layer and add a new layer. (IV) Proceed with
layer-wise training until training all the eight layers for the final DBN.
parts of the malware to evade anti-virus programs. These
new variants remained undetected until they were manually
detected, analyzed, and a signature was generated for them.
The six malware categories used are Zeus, Carberp, Spy-
Eye, Cidox, Andromeda, and DarkComet. All of these six
malware families are used to carry out a wide range of criminal
tasks, and have infected millions of computers worldwide.
Several crackdowns by the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies in numerous countries have resulted in the arrest of
more than a hundred persons involved with development and
use of these malware, but their variants are widely used to
the present day. The following is a brief description of the six
malware classes.
Zeus. Probably the most widely used Trojan for cyber
crime (especially for stealing financial information). It was
first detected in July 2007 and is still widely used both in
its original format and in thousands of variants which are con-
tinuously introduced to evade anti-viruses. It is estimated that
in the US alone it has infected about 3.6 million computers.
Several of the top malware programs used for stealing banking
information are based on variations of Zeus. The entire source
code of Zeus is freely available online, facilitating the creation
of new malware based on it.
Carberp. A widespread malware that silently downloads
and installs other malware components to the infected system.
It was first discovered in 2010 and reported as the sixth most
popular malware for stealing financial information. Currently
there are no clear estimates of the number of infected systems
or amount of money earned by the developers, as this malware
remains mostly underground. In its later versions it heavily
incorporates Zeus code.
SpyEye. First reported in 2009 as a banking Trojan but
it has been used to carry payloads for industrial espionage as
well. It has infected 1.4 million computers worldwide since
2009, and the developers of this malware have made more
than $3.2 million in a six-month period alone. It specializes
in stealing valuable personal information from the victim’s
computer, including banking login and passwords, credit card
numbers, social security numbers, etc.
Cidox. A remote administrative tool (RAT) which is mainly
used to control infected systems. This Trojan is not self-
replicating, but is rather spread via manual targeting of victims.
It is one of the first malware not hiding in the master boot
record of Windows operating system, and instead, hides in
network file system locations. It reconfigures the NTFS file
system’s program loader, thus becoming invisible in the file
system.
Andromeda. One of the most widespread non-replicating
spam bots, which mostly spreads via email-based infections.
It was inactive for a certain duration, but has recently resur-
faced with more sophisticated features. This malware was
first identified in February 2007, and it was reported that
most of the infected systems were in the European countries.
Andromeda is highly modular, and can incorporate various
modules (keylogger, screen capture, etc.).
DarkComet. A remote administration tool, first discovered
in February 2012. It is used in a wide range of targeted
attacks, and has the ability to take pictures via webcam,
record conversations via a microphone attached to the PC,
and gain full control of the infected machine. It is freely
available online, and as a result, one of the most popular
remote administration tools.
In 2011 the source code of Zeus was leaked, and since then
many other malware have started incorporating its code into
their program. As a result, at times it is difficult to categorize
a new variant as either Zeus or one of the other malware
families (e.g., variant of Carberp which uses many parts of
Zeus code is commonly referred to as “Zberp”). In this work
we use the categories provided by Kaspersky anti-virus as our
ground truth. That is, if Kaspersky classifies a malware as a
variant of Carberp, then for our purposes that is the correct
label (hence, the prediction task for our learning module is
difficult, because the six different classes of malware are not
completely separated.)
Each of the 1,800 programs in our dataset is run in Cuckoo
sandbox2, the most popular open source sandbox tool for
malware analysis. Cuckoo sandbox records native functions
and Windows API call traces, details of files created and
deleted from the filesystem, IP addresses, URLs and ports
accessed by the program, registry keys written, etc. The result
is saved in a text file in JSON file format (though note that
as described in the previous section our approach is agnostic
to the format of this text file, and completely ignores the
formatting). Using the procedure described in the previous
section each of these sandbox files is converted to a 20,000
sized bit-string, which is a rough fixed size representation of
the raw sandbox text file.
Having converted all our dataset to 1,800 vectors (each
of size 20,000), we randomly split them to 1,200 samples for
training (200 samples from each of the six categories) and 600
samples for testing (100 samples from each category).
B. Training the DBN
As described in the previous section, we train a deep de-
noising autoencoder consisting of eight layers (20,000–5,000–
2,500–1,000–500–250–100–30), with layer-wise training. To
further regularize the network and prevent overfitting, we use
dropout [10]. Each time a new input is given to the network,
each hidden unit is randomly omitted from the network with
a probability of 0.5 (i.e., about half of the units in the hidden
layer are omitted). The idea is that a hidden unit cannot rely
on other hidden units being present. Dropout is essentially
an efficient way for performing model averaging. Instead of
training many separate networks and then applying each of
these networks to the test data and calculating the average
over the predictions (which is computationally expensive),
random dropout makes it possible to train a huge number of
different networks in a reasonable time. In prediction time,
all the neurons in hidden layer are present, but their output
is multiplied by 0.5 (halved). Note that in our case, training
autoencoders, at each learning step we have only one hidden
layer. For example, when training the first layer 20,000 to
5,000 to 20,000, then only the neurons in the hidden layer
of 5,000 neurons are affected by dropout. During prediction,
the output of each of these hidden units is halved.
Instead of using the standard logistic or tanh activation
2Available at http://www.cuckoosandbox.org
Fig. 4. Illustration of all the stages from initial malware run in Sandbox to
signature derivation using DBN.
functions, we use rectified linear units (ReLU) for the non-
linearity function [7].
f(x) = max(0, x)
ReLU is widely used when training deep neural networks,
usually resulting in faster convergence and diminishes the
gradient vanishing problem, which especially affects deep
networks [3].
Other parameters we use are: noise ratio of 0.2 for denois-
ing autoencoders, 1000 training epochs (for each autoencoder
layer), learning rate which starts at 0.001 and linearly decays
to 0.000001, batch size of 20, and no momentum. We use an
L2 penalty for network regularization. Note that each layer has
an additional bias unit, which is connected to all the units in
the subsequent layer.
Due to the large network size (e.g., only the layer con-
necting 20,000 input neurons to 5,000 neurons contains more
than 100,000,000 weights which should be learned), we ran
the network on an Nvidia GeForce GTX 680 graphics card
(GPU). This reduced the training time to under two days.
Putting the above steps together, we have constructed an
end-to-end method for automatic signature generation: The
program is run in a sandbox, the sandbox file is converted to
a binary bit-string which is fed to the neural network, and the
deep neural network produces a 30-sized vector at its output
layer, which we treat as the signature of the program. See
Figure 4.
C. Experimental Results
We now examine the quality of the generated signatures
due to DeepSign. To do so, we feed all of our 1,800 vectors
of size 20,000 to the DBN, and convert them to 30-sized
representations (signatures).
Figure 5 provides a two dimensional visualization of the
data, where each node is one malware signature. The visual-
ization is generated using the t-distributed stochastic neighbor
embedding (t-SNE) algorithm [19], in this case reducing the
Fig. 5. A 2-dimensional visualization of the malware signatures (each node
is one malware signature), generated by the t-SNE dimensionality reduction
algorithm. Each color corresponds to one of six malware categories. Note that
the labels are used for coloring the nodes only, and otherwise the visualization
is due to completely unsupervised DBN.
dimensionality of the data from 30 (signature length) to 2. The
goal of t-SNE is to reduce the dimensionality such that the
closer two nodes are to each other in the original high dimen-
sional space, the closer they would be in the 2-dimensional
space. Note that the labels are used for coloring the nodes
only, and otherwise the visualization is due to unsupervised
DBN. The figure illustrates that variants of the same malware
family are mostly clustered together in the signature space,
demonstrating that the signatures due to DBN indeed capture
invariant representations of malware. Some clustering errors
are expected here (as can be seen in the visualization), since as
explained in Subsection IV-A, many of these malware classes
use parts of code from each other, and the distinction even
amongst anti-virus detections is blurred. Here we use the labels
given by Kaspersky anti-virus as the ground truth against
which we measure the performance of our method.
To further measure the quality of this compact representa-
tion, we train a supervised classifier on the 30-sized vectors
as follows: Train the classifier on the 1,200 vectors of size 30,
and then predict on the 600 test vectors (of size 30). The higher
the prediction accuracy is, the better the generated signatures
are.
We first train an SVM classifier3 using 1,200 signatures,
and then use it to predict the correct labels (out of 6 possi-
ble) on the 600 prediction signatures. The resulting accuracy
is 96.4%. Alternatively, running a basic k-nearest neighbor
algorithm (with k = 1) where each of the 600 prediction
samples are given the label of their nearest neighbor (Euclidean
distance) from the 1,200 training samples, results in an ac-
curacy of 95.3%. This high accuracy obtained when training
and predicting solely on the compact signature space attests to
the fact that DeepSign generates meaningful signatures for the
malware, resulting in successful detection of a high percentage
3We use the popular LIBSVM library [4].
of the malware variants generated with the purpose of evading
classical anti-virus signatures.
Finally, to examine whether the classification accuracy
in the supervised learning context can be improved, we use
the weights of the trained neural network due to the DBN
as the initial weights for a deep supervised neural network.
The supervised network has exactly the same layers as the
DBN, but with the addition of six neurons in the output layer
(corresponding to six categories of malware). The neurons
in this added output layer are softmax units, minimizing the
cross-entropy loss function. Training this network on the 1,200
input training samples (using input noise = 0.2, dropout = 0.5,
and learning rate = 0.001), and predicting on 600 test samples
results in 98.6% accuracy on test data, a relatively substantial
improvement over the SVM results.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we reviewed past approaches for generat-
ing signatures for malware programs, and proposed a novel
method based on deep belief networks. Current approaches for
malware signature generation use specific aspects of malware
(e.g., certain network traffic normality or a substring in the
program); thus, new malware variants easily evade detection
by modifying small parts of their code.
Our proposed approach is inspired by the recent success
in training deep neural networks which produce invariant
representations. We first run the malware in a sandbox and
then convert the sandbox log file to a long binary bit-string.
This bit-string is fed to a deep 8-layered neural network which
produces 30 values in its output layer. These values are used
as the signature of the program. The experimental results show
that the signatures produced by the DBN are highly successful
for malware detection. These signatures can either be used in
a completely unsupervised framework or used for supervised
malware classification.
The results presented here demonstrate that unsupervised
deep learning is a powerful method for generating high level
invariant representations in domains beyond computer vision,
language processing, or speech recognition; and can be applied
successfully to challenging domains such as malware signature
generation.
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